Xnews consolidating rc
Xnews consolidating rc - lucky dating sites in iran
D.â Establish an independent export license appeals panel to hear and decide disputes about whether export licenses are required, whether particular decisions to grant or deny licenses were made properly, and whether sunset requirements have been carried out properly.59 60 BEYOND âFORTRESS AMERICAâ It is necessary to ameliorate the policy logjam that is the unintended consequence of Congressâs inaction over dual-use export controls.
How- RECOMMENDATIONS 63 ever, serious complications can result from attempts to treat weapons components, subsystems, and parts as weapons themselves when those subsystems and components draw from a commercial or global technol- ogy base.
The new President needs to resolve the long-standing clash between the cabinet departments that are the guardians of national and homeland security interests, broadly defined, and the cabinet departments that are the promoters of national economic interests.
It is only at the presiden- tial level that the competing bureaucratic interests of these two areas can be weighed and the current system reformed, so as to stem the decline that so urgently needs attention.
Therefore, restric- tions on an unclassified technology should be implemented only when: â¢ The United States alone, or the United States and cooperating allies, possess technology that leads not only to identifiable military advan- tage, but to an advantage that is likely to persist for a significant period of time (i.e., the time needed to field a system based on that technology); â¢ The United States, or the United States acting together with allies, control the technology such that they can prevent it from moving into the hands of possible adversaries; â¢ The restrictions do not impose costs and inefficiencies that are disproportionate to the restrictionsâ security benefits; and â¢ Restrictions are re-examined and re-justified periodically to ensure they remain appropriate. research and development sectorsâpublic and private research labs and industryâmust remain better prepared to anticipate and capitalize on research breakthroughs than those who would use these advances to harm us or compete against us economically.
Protect the capability to ârun faster.â Advances in exploiting technology and in furthering research are typically made when the fundamentals in a field of science are understoodâa process that generally takes place in the unclassified and the international communities. Treat weapons separatelyâbut define them narrowly and precisely.
Our market economy, our research enterprise, our collaboration with other nations to defend ourselves, and our demo- cratic system of government all rest on a foundation of openness and international engagement.
Questions regarding possible controls and restrictions on science and technology must therefore start with a strong presumption for openness. Given the inefficiencies associated with restricting openness and engagement, such restrictions can be justified only when they can be implemented effectively and when their security benefits specifically outweigh the harm they will necessar- ily cause with respect to other values and objectives. Apply âsunsetâ requirements to unilaterally U. controlled items on export control lists No version of the current control system should survive without an effective method for pruning items from the control lists when they no longer serve a significant definable national security interest.The This set of principles provided the basis for a list of principles that could inform the Militarily Critical Technologies List, as requested by the Office of International Technology Security, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense.Recommendation 1 The President should restructure the export control process within the federal government so that the balancing of interests can be achieved more efficiently, and to prevent harm to the nationâs security and tech- nology base; as well as promote U. B.â Apply âsunsetâ requirements to all items on export control lists that are controlled unilaterally by the United States, and require find- ings to be made every 12 months that removing controls on an item would present a substantial risk to national security.C.â Establish as a new administrative entity a coordinating center for export controls, with responsibilities for coordinating all interfaces with persons or entities seeking export licenses and expediting agency processes with respect to the granting or denial of export licenses.Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book.